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Virtues and Their Vices, edited by Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd. Oxford 
University Press, 2014. Pp. 528. $120 (hardcover); $40 (paperback).
ADAM PELSER, United States Air Force Academy
Following the pioneering work of luminaries such as G. E. M. Anscombe 
and Alasdair MacIntyre, the revival of philosophical interest in the vir-
tues over the past half-century has given rise to a vast body of literature 
that is sometimes loosely categorized under the term “virtue theory,” but 
that represents a diverse array of research questions, methods of inquiry, 
and philosophical views. In the spirit of modern moral philosophy, many 
virtue ethicists have attempted to demonstrate that all moral concepts 
can be reduced to the notion of virtue, as opposed to duty or happiness. 
In a similar vein, some virtue epistemologists have appealed to the no-
tion of virtue in an attempt to define knowledge and resolve other central 
epistemological questions. Other virtue theorists have turned to empirical 
psychology to assess whether people actually have (or can develop) moral 
and intellectual virtues.
In contrast to, though not necessarily in conflict with, these approaches 
to the study of virtue, a small but growing number of philosophers and 
scholars from other disciplines (notably theology and psychology) have 
engaged in careful analysis of individual virtues, vices, and related 
psycho logical states with the aim of contributing to a robust vision of 
human flourishing and of deepening understanding of the human ex-
cellences constitutive of the good life. Virtues and Their Vices exemplifies 
this approach to the study of the virtues and does more than any other 
recent work to advance it. In this collection, Timpe and Boyd have gath-
ered together many of the foremost scholars of virtue to produce a volume 
notable not only for its impressive breadth—22 chapters, each written by 
a different author or partnership of co-authors—but also for the consis-
tent clarity and depth of insight of each of its chapters. Virtues and Their 
Vices significantly clarifies and illuminates the virtues that foster human 
flourishing and the vices that detract from it. This volume would be an 
excellent introduction for students new to the study of the virtues, and it 
is essential reading for scholars already working on character and moral 
psychology.
The volume is largely structured around traditional groupings of the 
virtues and vices. It contains five sections covering (1) the cardinal virtues, 
(2) the capital vices and their corrective virtues, (3) intellectual virtues, 
(4) the theological virtues, and (5) the virtues across various academic 
disciplines. In the remainder of this review I will highlight some of the 
distinctive themes and strengths (I think it fitting to call them “virtues”) of 
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the volume that run across its various sections and I will conclude by not-
ing some inevitable limitations (I certainly would not call them “vices”) of 
the volume that point toward areas ripe for further research.
One virtue of the volume that I expect will be of special interest to read-
ers of this journal is the volume’s sustained interaction with Christian 
philosophical theology of the virtues and vices, especially as codified in 
the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The history of Christian philosophical-
theological reflection on the virtues and vices provides a wealth of 
resources for contemporary reflection on moral character, but these re-
sources often go untapped by philosophers and psychologists working 
in this area today. This neglect of engagement with traditional Christian 
thought on moral character is especially evident in contemporary philo-
sophical reflection on the vices (or, rather, the sparsity thereof). As one 
piece of anecdotal evidence for such neglect, I was recently at a conference 
on the theme of virtue cultivation where one senior philosopher working 
in virtue ethics gave a talk on the need for a systematic philosophical 
analysis of the vices, a kind of DSM for disorders of moral character, and 
he was surprised to learn that Aquinas provides such a treatment of the 
capital vices in his Summa and De Malo.
Though the contributors to Virtues and Their Vices represent a variety of 
moral outlooks—some explicitly Christian, some not—the volume goes a 
long way toward bringing contemporary scholarship on virtues and vices 
(back) into conversation with the venerable history of Christian philo-
sophical and theological reflection on the moral life. In addition to three 
chapters focused on the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, as well 
as an excellent chapter on “Virtue in Theology” by Stephen Pope, several 
of the chapters on the cardinal virtues and the capital vices contain sus-
tained critical engagement with Aquinas’s analyses of the traits (notably 
the chapters on prudence, fortitude, lust, gluttony, sloth, envy, and pride). 
In his chapter on pride, Craig Boyd also provides a helpful discussion of 
Augustine’s treatment of superbia. Likewise, Colleen McCluskey, Robert 
Kruschwitz, and Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung draw insightfully on the 
Desert Fathers of the early Christian church, such as Evagrius of Pontus 
and John Cassian, in their respective analyses of lust and chastity, gluttony 
and abstinence, and sloth. McCluskey also draws on the wisdom of the 
Desert Mother, Amma Sarah.
While many of the chapters in the volume interact with Christian philo-
sophical theology, however, the volume is not (or at least not solely) aimed 
at analyzing the virtues and vices from the perspective of Christianity. In 
fact, another virtue of the volume is that many of the chapters present 
divergent and competing traditional understandings of their focal trait in 
order to clarify the nature of the trait. In his chapter on “Fortitude and 
the Conflict of Frameworks,” for example, Daniel McInerny compares the 
Northern courage depicted in Beowulf, Aquinas’s treatment of Christian 
fortitude, and the contemporary notion, lauded by Steve Jobs in his well-
known Stanford University commencement address, of the courage to 
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listen to one’s own “inner voice.” McInerny also offers a helpful discus-
sion, informed by MacIntyre, on how to adjudicate between competing 
moral frameworks in our search for the truth.
In another notable example of this comparative frameworks approach, 
McCluskey compares Aquinas’s treatment of lust as a vice and chastity 
as a virtue with Simon Blackburn’s recent analysis of lust as a virtue and 
chastity as a vice, noting that the two views are not as far apart as it might 
seem. Kruschwitz likewise provides an insightful comparative evaluation 
of the Stoic analysis of gluttony articulated by Epictetus’s teacher, Muso-
nius Rufus, and Aquinas’s Christian analysis of the vice. Although Ruth 
Groenhout’s chapter is not focused on a single virtue or vice, she engages 
in a careful comparative analysis of the frameworks of virtue ethics, Con-
fucian ethics, and feminist care ethics in an effort to show that Confucian 
and care ethics do not fit very well within the category of virtue ethics in 
the way that a common taxonomy of ethical theories might suggest.
As should be apparent by now, the volume is deeply rooted in and 
indebted to historical philosophical treatments of the virtues and vices. 
Despite its careful and sustained engagement with the history of philoso-
phy, however, the volume is not solely or even primarily a work in the 
history of philosophy of moral character. Yet another virtue of the volume 
is that it brings ancient wisdom about the virtues and vices into conversa-
tion with contemporary scientific and philosophical research. James Van 
Slyke, for example, draws on neuroscientific and psychological insights 
about the connections between emotion and cognition and the processes 
of imitation and simulation in order to better understand the forma-
tion of moral virtue and practical wisdom. He also offers a compelling 
virtue-theoretic critique of recent attempts to develop a reductive science 
of morality. In a different sort of engagement with contemporary neuro-
science and psychology, Andrew Pinsent creatively draws on research 
on autism and prosopagnosia (the inability to recognize faces) to explain 
Dante’s treatment of avarice as a particularly insidious vice. According to 
Pinsent, Dante recognized that avarice inhibits second-person relatedness, 
thereby causing a kind of “spiritual prosopagnosia.” Though less engaged 
with contemporary science than the two chapters just mentioned, Robert 
Roberts’s chapter on temperance provides a compelling and deeply in-
sightful Aristotelian analysis of the virtue. Roberts then brings his analysis 
into conversation with current psychological understandings of addiction 
in order to reveal the morally significant differences between suffering 
from an addiction and having the vice of intemperance.
Two chapters that are particularly noteworthy for bringing ancient wis-
dom into conversation with contemporary philosophical research are John 
Greco’s chapter on the intellectual virtue of episteme (which he identifies as 
a kind of understanding) and Jason Baehr’s chapter on the intellectual vir-
tue of sophia or wisdom. Both of these authors draw heavily on Aristotle in 
their development of neo-Aristotelian analyses of the intellectual virtues, 
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and they then clarify their analyses in conversation with contemporary 
epistemological debates.
One final virtue of the book that deserves mention is the way in which it 
illuminates the interconnections between the virtues and the vices. While 
the editors rightly raise concerns about the unity and reciprocity of the 
virtues theses in the introduction (pp. 9–11), certain virtues nevertheless 
seem to complement one another and even depend on each other for their 
fullest realization. Jay Wood highlights this interconnectedness of several 
virtues in his chapter on prudence and Roberts offers an insightful expla-
nation of the interdependence of temperance and justice in his chapter on 
the former. Also, as the section heading “The Capital Vices and Corrective 
Virtues” suggests, the chapters on the capital vices carefully consider the 
virtues that oppose and help to correct the individual vices. While she 
does not focus directly on the interdependence of various virtues, in her 
chapter on trust, Linda Zagzebski presents a compelling case that many 
of the virtues of the intellect are dependent on epistemic trust. As she puts 
it, “Epistemic trust has a crucial role in intellectual virtue since many of 
the intellectual virtues are either enhancements of epistemic trust or con-
straints on it” (269). In a similar move with respect to the moral virtues, 
Pope argues that all of the virtues depend for their content or “form” on 
charity. Interestingly, though, he argues that it is possible to possess prac-
tical wisdom about matters pertaining to salvation (infused prudence) 
while lacking practical wisdom about the ordinary affairs of life (acquired 
prudence).
Having highlighted four notable virtues of this volume, I conclude by 
drawing attention to some limitations of the volume that point toward 
areas ripe for further research. The first has to do with the volume’s treat-
ment of the intellectual virtues. The editors point out that their section on 
intellectual virtues diverges from Aristotle’s list by including a chapter 
on trust and no chapter on techne or nous (24), but the volume neverthe-
less reflects Aristotle’s treatment of the intellectual virtues by focusing on 
epistemic goods or achievements, as opposed to traits such as open-mind-
edness, intellectual humility, and intellectual respect. Of course, there is 
nothing wrong with following Aristotle’s characterization of the intel-
lectual virtues. And Zagzebski’s chapter on trust does helpfully discuss 
several intellectual trait virtues. So, the absence of individual chapters 
on these virtues is no real flaw of the volume. Yet, readers looking for 
in-depth treatments of intellectual character traits will have to look else-
where (e.g., Roberts and Woods’s Intellectual Virtues [Oxford University 
Press, 2007]).
A second limitation of the volume is that, given its focus on understand-
ing the natures of the virtues and vices, it devotes relatively little attention 
to questions surrounding how to cultivate the virtues and eliminate the 
vices. Of course, reflecting carefully and deeply on the nature of the vir-
tues and vices through the lens of robust moral outlooks can enhance the 
moral understanding constitutive of practical wisdom and inspire efforts 
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at virtue cultivation. Virtues and Their Vices thus importantly contributes to 
the project of moral formation. Moreover, some of the chapters in the vol-
ume explicitly discuss strategies and practices for cultivating the virtues 
and eliminating the vices (see, e.g., the chapters on temperance, gluttony, 
and sloth). Nevertheless, philosophers of virtue would do the academic 
community, the Church, and our society a great service by devoting more 
attention to understanding the processes of virtue formation. While it ob-
viously cannot accomplish everything in the space of one book, Virtues and 
Their Vices points to the need for more research in this area. To its credit, 
it also provides excellent foundational treatments of the virtues and vices 
that should help guide such research for many years to come. (Disclaimer: 
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policies or positions of the US Air Force, the US Depart-
ment of Defense, or the US government.)
